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UTAH v. STRIEFF: THE GRATUITOUS EXPANSION  
OF THE ATTENUATION DOCTRINE 
COURTNEY WATKINS 
In Utah v. Strieff,1 the United States Supreme Court assessed whether 
the prohibition on admitting evidence found through an illegal stop dissipates 
if the officer makes the stop, finds an outstanding warrant for the person’s 
arrest, and then discovers incriminating evidence.2  The Court held that the 
evidence seized by the officer following the unlawful stop was admissible 
because the discovery of the outstanding warrant “attenuated the connection” 
between the seizure and the police misconduct.3  In reaching its judgment, 
however, the Court incorrectly equated its “intervening circumstances” anal-
ysis to that prescribed under the independent source doctrine,4 ignoring the 
requirement that the intervening circumstance must be unforeseeable.5  Fur-
thermore, the Court erred in concluding that the officer’s actions were merely 
negligent, and not “purposeful or flagrant.”6  This conclusion drastically 
broadens the attenuation doctrine and ignores the prime purpose of the ex-
clusionary rule: the deterrence of unlawful police conduct.7  The Court should 
have weighed the “intervening circumstances” factor and the “purpose and 
flagrancy” factor in favor of the Respondent, Mr. Strieff, and affirmed the 
lower court’s decision to suppress the incriminating evidence. 
I. THE CASE 
In December of 2006, a caller left an anonymous tip reporting “narcotics 
activity” at a home in Salt Lake City, Utah.8  In response, Officer Douglas 
Fackrell conducted “intermittent surveillance” of the house over the course 
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 1.  136 S. Ct. 2056 (2016). 
 2.  Id. at 2059.  
 3.  Id.  
 4.  Strieff, 136 S. Ct. at 2062; see also infra Part IV.A.2.  
 5.  Strieff, 136 S. Ct. at 2073 (Kagan, J., dissenting); see also infra Part IV.A.1. 
 6.  Strieff, 136 S. Ct. at 2063; see also infra Part IV.B. 
 7.  United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 347 (1974); see also infra Part IV.B. 
 8.  State v. Strieff, 357 P.3d 532, 536 (Utah 2015), rev’d sub nom. Utah v. Strieff, 136 S. Ct. 
2056 (2016).  
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of a week,9 during which he observed “short term traffic” frequent enough to 
raise his suspicion.10  During Officer Fackrell’s surveillance, he saw Edward 
Strieff leave the home and walk towards a convenience store.11  Officer 
Fackrell approached Mr. Strieff, ordered him to stop in the parking lot, and 
requested his identification.12  Mr. Strieff complied.13  Officer Fackrell then 
called dispatch to run Mr. Strieff’s identification and was informed of “a 
small traffic warrant” for Mr. Strieff.14 
Upon learning of Mr. Strieff’s outstanding warrant, Officer Fackrell ar-
rested Mr. Strieff and searched his person, finding drug paraphernalia and a 
plastic baggie filled with methamphetamine.15  Mr. Strieff was consequently 
charged for these possessions.16  At trial, Mr. Strieff moved to suppress the 
evidence seized during the search, arguing that it was the “fruit of an unlawful 
investigatory stop.”17  While the State conceded that Officer Fackrell did not 
have reasonable suspicion to stop Mr. Strieff and, therefore, the stop was il-
legal, it argued that the exclusionary rule did not bar the evidence seized be-
cause the attenuation exception applied.18  The district court agreed with the 
State’s argument and denied Mr. Strieff’s motion to suppress.19  The court 
found that Officer Fackrell had initiated the stop for investigatory purposes, 
and although he lacked the reasonable suspicion to stop Mr. Strieff, the stop 
was not a blatant violation of the Forth Amendment, but rather a “good faith 
mistake.”20  The court then weighed all of the factors and found that suppres-
sion was not a suitable remedy, as the search was conducted after Officer 
Fackrell discovered a warrant for Mr. Strieff’s arrest, “an intervening circum-
stance” that he “did not cause and could not have anticipated.”21  Upon the 
district court’s denial of Mr. Strieff’s motion, he entered a conditional guilty 
plea but reserved the right to take an appeal to challenge the trial court’s de-
nial of his motions to suppress and reconsider.22  The Utah Court of Appeals 
affirmed the decision of the district court, agreeing that Officer Fackrell’s 
discovery of the outstanding warrant was an intervening circumstance that 
                                                          
 9.  Id.  Officer Fackrell conducted irregular surveillance of the residence over the course of 
one week, which amounted to around three hours of surveillance in total.  Id.  
 10.  Id. Officer Fackrell observed visitors entering the house and then leaving within a couple 
of minutes.  Id. 
 11.  Id. 
 12.  Id.  
 13.  Id. 
 14.  Id. 
 15.  Id. 
 16.  Id. 
 17.  Id. 
 18.  Id. at 536–37; see also infra Part II.B.4. 
 19.  Strieff, 357 P.3d at 537. 
 20.  Id.; see also infra Part II.B.3.  
 21.  Strieff, 357 P.3d at 537. 
 22.  Id.  
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removed the taint from the evidence that was subsequently found on Mr. 
Strieff’s person.23  Additionally, the court noted that Officer Fackrell’s ac-
tions were not a purposeful attack on Mr. Strieff’s Fourth Amendment 
rights.24 
On appeal to the Supreme Court of Utah, the high court did not deter-
mine that the facts of Strieff were insufficient to meet the requirements of the 
attenuation doctrine, but rather, that the facts of Strieff did not implicate the 
attenuation doctrine at all.25  The court reasoned that the attenuation doctrine 
is limited to cases “involving a defendant’s independent acts of free will,”26 
recognizing that the Supreme Court traditionally applied the doctrine in cases 
where a defendant has freely given a statement or consented to a search fol-
lowing an unconstitutional search or seizure.27  The court then applied the 
three-factor attenuation test first set out in Brown v. Illinois,28 the results of 
which explained why the attenuation doctrine was not implicated by the dis-
covery of an arrest warrant.29  That test considers: (1) “the presence of ‘inter-
vening circumstances,’” (2) “the ‘temporal proximity’ of the unlawful deten-
tion and the discovery of incriminating evidence,” and (3) the “‘purpose and 
flagrancy’ of the official misconduct.”30  The court first focused on the inter-
vening circumstances factor, explaining that an intervening circumstance 
must be “sufficiently distinguishable” from the initial illegality.31  The court 
also noted that an intervening circumstance must be an unforeseeable and 
independent event in order to cut off the causal connection between the un-
lawful act and subsequent discovery.32  The court asserted that the discovery 
of an arrest warrant could never be an intervening circumstance, as “[i]t is 
                                                          
 23.  Id.  
 24.  Id.  
 25.  Id. at 544.  
 26.  Id.  
 27.  Id. at 545.  The court relied on Supreme Court cases that involved a defendant giving a 
confession after “an initial unlawful arrest.”  Id. at 544; see, e.g., Kaupp v. Texas, 538 U.S. 626, 
633 (2003) (suppressing the defendant’s murder confession after the State failed to allege “‘any 
meaningful intervening event’ between the illegal arrest and [the defendant’s] confession” (quoting 
Taylor v. Alabama, 457 U.S. 687, 691 (1982))); Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 604–05 (1975) 
(finding that the defendant’s statement, made less than two hours after the illegal arrest, lacked an 
intervening circumstance that would trigger the attenuation doctrine); Wong Sun v. United States, 
371 U.S. 471, 491 (1963) (finding that the confession given by the defendant several days after his 
unlawful arraignment was not fruit of the poisonous tree, as the connection between the arrest and 
the defendant’s confession had “become so attenuated as to dissipate the taint” (first quoting Nar-
done v. United States, 308 U.S. 338, 341 (1939); then quoting State v. Arroyo, 796 P.2d 684, 690 
n.4 (Utah 1990)).  
 28.  422 U.S. 590 (1975). 
 29.  Strieff, 357 P.3d at 544–45.   
 30.  Id. at 541 (quoting Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 603–04 (1975)). 
 31.  Id. at 544 (quoting Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 592 (2006)). 
 32.  Id. at 544–45. 
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part of the natural, ordinary course of events arising out of an arrest or deten-
tion.”33 
The court then turned to the temporal proximity factor, remarking that, 
usually, “an extended time lapse” supports a finding of attenuation.34  The 
court asserted that applying the temporal proximity factor to a case involving 
the discovery of a warrant, however, “turn[s] the inquiry on its head,” as it 
would incentivize the government to exchange one constitutional right for 
another.35  The court explained that a significant time lapse between the initial 
unlawful detention and the warrant check would weigh in favor of the gov-
ernment in an attenuation doctrine analysis.36  This time lapse, however, 
would be in direct conflict with the government’s constitutional duty to avoid 
“unreasonable delay associated with an individual’s detention by the govern-
ment.”37  The court found that the temporal proximity factor could only apply 
in cases where there was an independent act perpetuated by the defendant, 
separate from the initial police misconduct, not in an instance where the of-
ficer searched for and discovered an outstanding warrant himself.38  Turning 
to the final factor, the court found that the “purpose and flagrancy” factor was 
also ill suited for cases involving an outstanding warrant, because the factor 
considers how the offending officer’s actions affected the defendant’s ar-
rest.39  In particular, the court found that this factor was meant to evaluate 
whether the officer’s conduct was “calculated to cause surprise, fright, and 
confusion.”40  The court determined that whether law enforcement’s illegal 
arrest causes “surprise, fright, and confusion” is irrelevant to cases involving 
outstanding warrants.41  The court ultimately held that the attenuation doc-
trine only applies to instances involving a defendant’s “independent acts of 
free will” and that the doctrine is not applicable when an officer makes an 
unconstitutional stop and subsequently finds an outstanding warrant.42 
The court then declared that when there are “two parallel acts of police 
work—one a violation of the Fourth Amendment (detention without reason-
able suspicion) and the other perfectly legal (execution of an outstanding ar-
rest warrant),” the inevitable discovery doctrine is implicated.43  Even so, the 
                                                          
 33.  Id. at 545. 
 34.  Id. 
 35.  Id. 
 36.  Id.  
 37.  Id. (citing United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 686 (1985)). 
 38.  Id.  
 39.  Id. 
 40.  Id. (quoting Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 605 (1975)). 
 41.  Id.  The court found that the use of actions meant to cause “surprise, fright, and confusion” 
were typically intended to illicit a confession from a defendant.  Id.  
 42.  Id. 
 43.  Id.  The court stated further: “[T]his exception exempts from exclusion evidence that is the 
but-for result of police misconduct but that also would inevitably have been produced by untainted 
police work.”  Id.  
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court found that under the inevitable discovery doctrine, suppression would 
still be necessary, as it would be impossible to determine if the Defendant 
would have been in possession of the contraband “on any future date on 
which he may have been arrested on the outstanding warrant.”44  The Su-
preme Court of Utah ultimately reversed the decision of the Utah Court of 
Appeals, granted Mr. Strieff’s motion to suppress, and found that the attenu-
ation doctrine was not an applicable exception to the exclusionary rule.45  The 
Supreme Court of the United States granted certiorari to determine whether 
the “attenuation doctrine applies when an officer makes an unconstitutional 
investigatory stop; learns during that stop that the suspect is subject to a valid 
arrest warrant; and proceeds to arrest the suspect and seize incriminating ev-
idence during a search incident to that arrest.”46 
II.  LEGAL BACKGROUND 
The exclusionary rule is a tool used by the courts to protect citizens’ 
rights guaranteed under the Fourth Amendment.47  Specifically, the rule pro-
vides a remedy for evidence discovered through an unconstitutional search 
or seizure.48  The rule’s protections, while significant, are not limitless, and 
are applicable only when the benefits of excluding evidence seized in viola-
tion of the Fourth Amendment outweigh the costs.49  Part II.A of this Note 
will review the implementation of the exclusionary rule in both federal and 
state courts and will explain the scope of the exclusionary rule.50  Addition-
ally, Part II.A will examine the purpose behind the exclusionary rule.51  Part 
II.B of this Note will explore the exceptions to the exclusionary rule, where 
the Court has determined the costs of its implementation are too substantial.52 
A.  The Exclusionary Rule Forbids the Use of Evidence Obtained 
Though Unconstitutional Means Under the Fourth Amendment 
The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution protects “[t]he 
right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, 
against unreasonable searches and seizures.”53  In Boyd v. United States,54 the 
                                                          
 44.  Id. at 546.  
 45.  Id. 
 46.  Utah v. Strieff, 136 S. Ct. 2056, 2059 (2016).  
 47.  Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 635 (1886). 
 48.  Byars v. United States, 273 U.S. 28, 29–30 (1927).   
 49.  Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 591 (2006) (quoting Pa. Bd. of Prob. & Parole v. Scott, 
524 U.S. 357, 363 (1998)). 
 50.  See infra Part II.A. 
 51.  See infra Part II.A. 
 52.  See infra Part II.B. 
 53.  U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
 54.  116 U.S. 616 (1886). 
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Supreme Court created a judicial remedy for Fourth Amendment violations 
with what is now known as the exclusionary rule.55  Simply put, the exclu-
sionary rule mandates that evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth 
Amendment is inadmissible in a criminal trial.56  In Weeks v. United States,57 
the Court emphasized that the Fourth Amendment is moot without a judicial 
remedy in place58 and that the protections of the Fourth Amendment are 
granted to all citizens, whether they are accused of a crime or not.59 
The Court expanded the protections of the exclusionary rule in Sil-
verthorne Lumber Co. v. United States,60 holding that any evidence acquired 
as a result of the assistance of illegally obtained information is also inadmis-
sible in a criminal trial.61  The Court explained that the Fourth Amendment 
requires not only that evidence acquired through unconstitutional means shall 
not be used in court, “but that it shall not be used at all.”62  In Segura v. United 
States,63 the Court elaborated, “the exclusionary rule reaches not only pri-
mary evidence obtained as a direct result of an illegal search or seizure, but 
also evidence later discovered and found to be derivative of an illegality[,]” 
a doctrine now known as “fruit of the poisonous tree.”64  In Mapp v. Ohio,65 
the Supreme Court held that these restrictions apply equally in state courts, 
ruling that evidence obtained through the violation of the Fourth Amendment 
is inadmissible in state and federal courts alike.66 
                                                          
 55.  Id. at 635.  
 56.  Byars v. United States, 273 U.S. 28, 29–30 (1927).  In Byars, the Court stated:  
A search prosecuted in violation of the Constitution is not made lawful by what it brings 
to light; and the doctrine has never been recognized by this Court, nor can it be tolerated 
under our constitutional system, that evidences of crime discovered by a federal officer 
in making a search without lawful warrant may be used against the victim of the unlawful 
search where a timely challenge has been interposed. 
Id. (citing Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20, 33 (1925); Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298, 
306 (1921); Amos v. United States, 255 U.S. 313 (1920); Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 
251 U.S. 385, 391 (1920); Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 393 (1914)). 
 57.  232 U.S. 383 (1914). 
 58.  Id. at 393.  In Weeks, the Court asserted: 
If letters and private documents can thus be seized and held and used in evidence against 
a citizen accused of an offense, the protection of the Fourth Amendment declaring his 
right to be secure against such searches and seizures is of no value, and, so far as those 
thus placed are concerned, might as well be stricken from the Constitution. 
Id.  
 59.  Id. at 392.  
 60.  251 U.S. 385 (1920). 
 61.  Id. at 392. 
 62.  Id.  
 63.  468 U.S. 796 (1984). 
 64.  Id. at 804 (first citing Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 398 (1914); then quoting 
Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338, 341 (1939)).  
 65.  367 U.S. 643 (1961). 
 66.  Id. at 655.  The Supreme Court initially declined to apply the exclusionary rule to the states, 
assuming that each state had other means of protection, making the application to the states unnec-
essary.  Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 29–31 (1949). 
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The Supreme Court has viewed the exclusionary rule as a multipurpose 
tool that both deters unlawful police conduct and upholds judicial integrity.67  
In Elkins v. United States,68 the Supreme Court noted that the rule was meant 
to “prevent, not to repair” injustices associated with the violation of Fourth 
Amendment rights.69  According to the Court, the exclusionary rule’s “pur-
pose is to deter—to compel respect for the constitutional guaranty in the only 
effectively available way—by removing the incentive to disregard it.”70  The 
Court has also emphasized the importance of the exclusionary rule as a limi-
tation on courts that, when followed, upholds the protections guaranteed un-
der the Fourth Amendment.71  The Court stressed that the judiciary could not 
allow consideration of evidence obtained through violation of the Constitu-
tion without being “accomplices in willful disobedience of law.”72  Although 
the Weeks Court found that both deterrence and judicial integrity guided the 
exclusionary rule,73 more recent cases have understated the judicial integrity 
justification and instead emphasized the deterrence rationale.74  In United 
States v. Calandra,75 for example, the Court has emphasized that the “prime 
purpose” of the exclusionary rule “is to deter future unlawful police con-
duct.”76  In Davis v. United States,77 the Court went as far to say that the “sole 
purpose” of the exclusionary rule “is to deter future Fourth Amendment vio-
lations”78 and emphasized that in cases “[w]here suppression fails to yield 
‘appreciable deterrence,’ exclusion is ‘clearly . . . unwarranted.’”79 
B.  Exceptions to the Exclusionary Rule 
While the Court has recognized the exclusionary rule’s “broad deterrent 
purpose,” it has still noted that the rule was never meant to forbid “the use of 
                                                          
 67.  Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 486 (1963).  The Court in Wong Sun found that 
the policies underlying the exclusionary rule were “deterring lawless conduct by federal officers” 
and “closing the doors of the federal courts to any use of evidence unconstitutionally obtained.”  Id. 
(first citing Rea v. United States, 350 U.S. 214 (1956); then citing Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 
206 (1960)). 
 68.  364 U.S. 206 (1960). 
 69.  Id. at 217. 
 70.  Id.  
 71.  Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 391–92 (1914). 
 72.  McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 345 (1942). 
 73.  Weeks, 232 U.S. at 391–92. 
 74.  See United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 (1974); see also Davis v. United States, 564 
U.S. 229 (2011). 
 75.  414 U.S. 338 (1974). 
 76.  Id. at 347. 
 77.  564 U.S. 229 (2011). 
 78.  Id. at 236–37. 
 79.  Id. at 237 (quoting United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 454 (1976)).  The Court acknowl-
edged the heavy toll associated with the application of the exclusionary rule, namely the release of 
criminals without just punishment through the suppression of otherwise reliable evidence.  Id.  
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illegally seized evidence in all proceedings or against all persons.”80  The 
Supreme Court has acknowledged the “substantial social costs”81 of the ex-
clusionary rule, finding that the “[s]uppression of evidence . . . has always 
been our last resort, not our first impulse.”82  Consequently, the Court has 
deemed the exclusionary rule to be “applicable only . . . ‘where its deterrence 
benefits outweigh its substantial social costs.’”83  Consistent with this con-
sideration, the Court has laid out several specific exceptions to the exclusion-
ary rule in circumstances where the social costs of not admitting the illegally 
seized evidence outweigh the deterrence benefits.84  Pertinent here are the 
independent source doctrine, inevitable discovery doctrine, good faith excep-
tion, and attenuation doctrine. 
1.  Independent Source Doctrine 
In Nix v. Williams,85 the Supreme Court declared that “[t]he independent 
source doctrine allows admission of evidence that has been discovered by 
means wholly independent of any constitutional violation.”86  The Court ex-
plained that the public interest in both “deterring unlawful police conduct” 
and providing juries with “all probative evidence of a crime are properly bal-
anced by putting the police in the same, not a worse, position that [sic] they 
would have been in if no police error or misconduct had occurred.”87  The 
Nix Court found that the exclusion of evidence that came from an independ-
ent source, entirely unconnected to any purported Fourth Amendment viola-
tion, “would put the police in a worse position than they would have been in 
absent any error or violation.”88  Ultimately, the independent source doctrine 
turns on the primary purpose of the exclusionary rule: deterrence of police 
misconduct.89  In Murray v. United States,90 the Court concluded that when 
evidence is “‘wholly independent of’ the constitutional violation, then exclu-
sion arguably will have no effect on a law enforcement officer’s incentive to 
commit an unlawful search,” and, therefore, the evidence should not be ex-
cluded.91 
                                                          
 80.  Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 at 348.  
 81.  Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 591 (2006) (quoting United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 
897, 907 (1984)). 
 82.  Id.  
 83.  Id. (quoting Pa. Bd. of Prob. & Parole v. Scott, 524 U.S. 357, 363 (1998)).  
 84.  See supra Part II.B.1–4.  
 85.  467 U.S. 431 (1984). 
 86.  Id. at 443. 
 87.  Id.  
 88.  Id. 
 89.  Murray v. United States, 487 U.S. 533, 544–45 (1988) (Marshall, J., dissenting).  
 90.  487 U.S. 533 (1988). 
 91.  Id. at 545 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (quoting Nix, 467 U.S. at 443). 
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2.  Inevitable Discovery Doctrine 
The inevitable discovery doctrine is similar to the independent source 
doctrine, as it also seeks to prevent the government from being in a worse 
position than it would have been absent the police error or misconduct.92  The 
Supreme Court first adopted the inevitable discovery doctrine in Nix v. Wil-
liams.93  The Court again turned to the primary purpose of the exclusionary 
rule in its holding—deterrence of police misconduct—to find that if the evi-
dence ultimately “would have been discovered by lawful means . . . then the 
deterrence rationale has so little basis that the evidence should be received.”94  
The Court concluded “[e]xclusion of physical evidence that would inevitably 
have been discovered adds nothing to either the integrity or fairness of a crim-
inal trial.”95  The Court ultimately held that when “the evidence in question 
would inevitably have been discovered without reference to the police error 
or misconduct,” that evidence should not be suppressed.96 
3.  Good Faith Exception 
The good faith exception to the exclusionary rule was established 
through two companion cases and, again, focused on the deterrence of police 
misconduct.97  In United States v. Leon,98 the Court restated, the “deterrent 
purpose of the exclusionary rule necessarily assumes that the police have en-
gaged in willful, or at the very least negligent, conduct which has deprived 
the defendant of some right.”99  The Court then noted that because of the 
deterrent purpose behind the exclusionary rule, “evidence obtained from a 
search should be suppressed only if it can be said that the law enforcement 
officer had knowledge, or may properly be charged with knowledge, that the 
search was unconstitutional under the Fourth Amendment.”100  This excep-
tion has traditionally been applied in cases where the constitutional violation 
                                                          
 92.  Nix, 467 U.S. at 443–44. 
 93.  Id. at 440–41, 444.  In Nix v. Williams, the defendant led local police to the remains of a 
missing girl after making an incriminating statement that was illegally obtained.  Id. at 435–36.  The 
Court held that the evidence would not be suppressed because the search party would have inevita-
bly discovered the girl’s body had their search continued.  Id. at 449–50.  
 94.  Id. at 444.  
 95.  Id. at 446. 
 96.  Id. at 448. 
 97.  See United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 921 (1984) (finding that “[p]enalizing [an] officer 
for [a] magistrate judge’s error cannot logically contribute to the deterrence of Fourth Amendment 
violations”); Massachusetts v. Sheppard, 468 U.S. 981, 990–91 (1984) (noting that suppressing ev-
idence because of a magistrate judge’s clerical errors “will not serve the deterrent function that the 
exclusionary rule was designed to achieve”).  
 98.  468 U.S. 897 (1984).  
 99.  Id. at 919 (quoting United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531, 539 (1975)). 
 100.  Id. (quoting Peltier, 422 U.S. 531 at 539).  
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was in response to an error made by someone other than the offending of-
ficer.101  In instances where the offending officer has acted in good faith, the 
Court has held, “the marginal or nonexistent benefits produced by suppress-
ing evidence obtained . . . cannot justify the substantial costs of exclusion.”102 
4.  Attenuation Doctrine 
The exclusionary rule exception at issue in Utah v. Strieff was the atten-
uation doctrine.103  Under the attenuation doctrine, evidence is admissible 
when the connection between the discovery of the evidence and the uncon-
stitutional misconduct has become “so attenuated as to dissipate the taint” of 
the misconduct.104  In Wong Sun v. United States,105 the Court found that ev-
idence is not considered “‘fruit of the poisonous tree’ simply because it would 
not have come to light but for the illegal actions of the police.”106  Instead, 
the Court must assess whether the evidence in question was discovered 
through the exploitation of the unlawful police conduct, or instead, by “suf-
ficiently distinguishable” means.107  In Brown v. Illinois,108 for example, the 
Court evaluated whether the use of Miranda warnings was enough to dissi-
pate the taint of a confession obtained after an illegal arrest.109  The Court 
found that the police officer’s use of Miranda warnings alone could not at-
tenuate the connection between the officer’s unconstitutional arrest of the de-
fendant and the defendant’s subsequent confession.110  In reaching its hold-
ing, the Court proposed a three-factor test to determine whether sufficient 
attenuation exists: (1) the “temporal proximity” between the unlawful police 
conduct and the discovery of the challenged evidence,111 (2) “the presence of 
intervening circumstances,”112 and (3) “the purpose and flagrancy of the of-
ficial misconduct.”113 
                                                          
 101.  See generally Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1 (1995).  In Arizona v. Evans, an officer pulled 
over the defendant for a traffic violation, ran his name, and found an outstanding warrant for his 
arrest.  Id. at 4. The officer then arrested the defendant and located drugs on his person.  Id.  After 
the arrest, it was discovered that the outstanding warrant had been quashed and was no longer valid.  
Id.  The Court still determined that the evidence was admissible because its suppression would not 
have any significant deterrence effect.  Id. at 14–15.  
 102.  Leon, 468 U.S. at 922.  
 103.  Utah v. Strieff, 136 S. Ct. 2056, 2061 (2016). 
 104.  Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338, 341 (1939).  
 105.  371 U.S. 471 (1963). 
 106.  Id. at 487–88. 
 107.  Id. at 488 (quoting JOHN MACARTHUR MAGUIRE, EVIDENCE OF GUILT: RESTRICTIONS 
UPON ITS DISCOVERY OR COMPULSORY DISCLOSURE 221 (1959)). 
 108.  422 U.S. 590 (1975). 
 109.  Id. at 591–92.  
 110.  Id. at 604–05.   
 111.  Id. at 603 (citing United States v. Owen, 492 F2d 1100, 1107 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 
419 U.S. 965 (1974) (mem.)). 
 112.  Id. at 604 (citing Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356, 365 (1972)). 
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Ultimately, the Supreme Court offered these four separate exceptions to 
the exclusionary rule to highlight the “prime purpose” of the rule: the deter-
rence of unlawful police conduct.114  While the Court’s precedent has valued 
the protections guaranteed under the Fourth Amendment, it has also acknowl-
edged the balance between those protections and the need for a fair and thor-
ough criminal justice system.115  Under these four exceptions to the exclu-
sionary rule, the Court has found that the “substantial social costs” outweigh 
any deterrence benefits.116 
III.  THE COURT’S REASONING 
In Utah v. Strieff, the Supreme Court reversed the Supreme Court of 
Utah’s decision, holding that the incriminating evidence seized from Mr. 
Strieff following his arrest was “admissible because the officer’s discovery 
of the arrest warrant attenuated the connection between the unlawful stop and 
the evidence seized.”117  The Court first noted that the scope of the exclusion-
ary rule includes “both the ‘primary evidence obtained as a direct result of an 
illegal search or seizure’” and, relevant in this case, evidence discovered us-
ing knowledge gained through an illegal search or seizure, also known as 
“fruit of the poisonous tree.”118  The Court then acknowledged the significant 
costs associated with the exclusionary rule, deeming it appropriate only 
“where its deterrence benefits outweigh its substantial social costs.”119  As a 
result, evidence should not be suppressed under the exclusionary rule when 
the causal connection between the unlawful search or seizure and the discov-
ery of the evidence is broken by an intervening circumstance.120  The Court 
specifically noted that in such a case, the interests protected by the Fourth 
Amendment “would not be served by [suppressing] the evidence ob-
tained.”121 
The Court first evaluated whether the attenuation doctrine applied and, 
more generally, whether the doctrine is implicated in cases involving the dis-
covery of a pre-existing arrest warrant.122  The Court rejected the Supreme 
Court of Utah’s assertion that the attenuation doctrine only applies to cases 
“involving an independent act of a defendant’s ‘free will’ in confessing to a 
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crime or consenting to a search.”123  Instead, the Court found that the attenu-
ation doctrine more broadly examines the causal connection between the un-
constitutional police conduct and the discovery of the evidence at issue, a 
connection that does not require an independent act of a defendant.124  Thus, 
the attenuation doctrine may apply in circumstances involving the discovery 
of a pre-existing warrant.125  Upon reaching this preliminary conclusion, the 
Court applied the three-factor test articulated in Brown.126  The Court con-
cluded that although the temporal proximity of the illegal stop and the search 
weighed in favor of suppressing the evidence, countervailing considerations 
supported the conclusion that the evidence was admissible under the attenu-
ation doctrine.127 
On the first Brown prong, the Court considered the temporal proximity 
between the illegal stop and the discovery of the evidence on Mr. Strieff’s 
person.128  The Strieff Court reasoned that the temporal proximity factor will 
support the suppression of the evidence unless a “‘substantial time’ elapses 
between an unlawful act and when the evidence is obtained.”129  The Court 
noted that Officer Fackrell discovered the methamphetamine and drug para-
phernalia only minutes after Mr. Strieff was illegally stopped, and this short 
time frame favored suppressing the evidence that was discovered during the 
search.130 
The Court then addressed the second attenuation doctrine factor, the 
“presence of intervening circumstances,” and found that Officer Fackrell’s 
discovery of Mr. Strieff’s outstanding warrant was an intervening circum-
stance that attenuated the causal connection between the unconstitutional po-
lice conduct and the discovery of the incriminating evidence.131  The Court 
compared the discovery of the outstanding warrant to the facts at issue in 
Segura v. United States, where agents of the state sought a warrant and, while 
waiting for that warrant, illegally entered the apartment to conduct a security 
sweep.132  While inside the apartment, the agents “discovered evidence of 
drug activity.”133  The next day, a judge issued a search warrant for the apart-
ment.134  The Supreme Court held that the evidence of the drug activity was 
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admissible because the information that the agents used to obtain the legal 
search warrant was known before they entered the apartment and was uncon-
nected to the initial illegal entry.135  The Strieff majority acknowledged that 
the Segura Court applied the independent source doctrine, and not the atten-
uation doctrine, but still found that the decision “suggested that the existence 
of a valid warrant favors finding that the connection between unlawful con-
duct and the discovery of evidence is ‘sufficiently attenuated to dissipate the 
taint.’”136  The Court reasoned that Mr. Strieff’s warrant was issued prior to 
Officer Fackrell’s investigation, and thus, the issuance was unrelated to this 
investigation.137  Additionally, the Court noted that “once Officer Fackrell 
discovered the warrant, he had an obligation to arrest Strieff.”138  The Court 
found that following Mr. Strieff’s arrest, it was completely lawful for Officer 
Fackrell to search Mr. Strieff as a means of protecting the officer’s safety.139 
The Court then turned to the final factor, which considers “the purpose 
and flagrancy of the official misconduct.”140  The Court noted that the pur-
pose of the exclusionary rule is to deter police misconduct and that police 
misconduct involving purposeful or flagrant actions is when deterrence is 
most needed.141  The Court determined that Officer Fackrell’s actions were 
negligent at most and not purposeful or flagrant, finding that he only made 
two good-faith mistakes.142  First, Officer Fackrell did not see Mr. Strieff 
enter the “suspected drug house,” only exit it.143  Therefore, Officer Fackrell 
lacked a sufficient basis to conclude that Mr. Strieff was a “short-term visi-
tor” there to complete a drug transaction.144  Second, because there was in-
sufficient information to suggest that Mr. Strieff was a “short-term visitor,” 
Officer Fackrell should have only requested to speak with Mr. Strieff instead 
of demanding it,145 as he was simply trying to investigate what was happening 
inside the house.146  Despite the faults in Officer Fackrell’s conduct, the Court 
determined that these faults did not amount to “a purposeful or flagrant vio-
lation of Strieff’s Fourth Amendment rights.”147  The Court found that 
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“[w]hile Officer Fackrell’s decision to initiate the stop was mistaken, his con-
duct thereafter was lawful.”148  Additionally, the majority found that there 
was “no indication that this unlawful stop was part of any systemic or recur-
rent police misconduct” and instead found that it was “an isolated instance of 
negligence.”149  After applying all three factors, the Court held that the evi-
dence Officer Fackrell found on Mr. Strieff’s person was admissible, because 
the discovery of the arrest warrant attenuated the connection between the un-
constitutional stop and the incriminating evidence.150  The Court found that 
although the temporal proximity factor weighed in favor of suppression, it 
was offset by the other two factors.151  Ultimately, the Court held that the 
discovery of the pre-existing arrest warrant was an intervening circumstance 
and that there was “no evidence that Officer Fackrell’s illegal stop reflected 
flagrantly unlawful police misconduct.”152 
Justice Sotomayor filed a dissenting opinion criticizing the majority’s 
holding, which she characterized as permitting “the discovery of a warrant 
for an unpaid parking ticket [to] forgive a police officer’s violation of [a per-
son’s] Fourth Amendment rights.”153  Justice Sotomayor reasoned that ad-
mitting this evidence “would tell officers that unlawfully discovering even a 
‘small traffic warrant’ would give them license to search for evidence of un-
related offenses.”154  Justice Sotomayor noted that an officer breaches the 
protections guaranteed under the Fourth Amendment when he detains a citi-
zen to run a warrant check without reasonable suspicion155 and then “deepens 
the breach when he prolongs the detention just to fish further for evidence of 
wrongdoing.”156  She rejected the argument that the officer’s actions should 
have been forgiven simply because his instincts were correct,157 noting 
“[w]hen ‘lawless police conduct’ uncovers evidence of lawless civilian con-
duct,”158 the Supreme Court has mandated that criminal courts suppress the 
unlawfully obtained evidence.159 
Justice Sotomayor then explored the policy issues that could arise from 
this decision arguing that the exclusionary rule “removes [the] incentive for 
officers to search us without proper justification.”160  She also acknowledged 
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the other well-known purpose of the rule: to uphold judicial integrity and to 
keep the courts from sanctioning a police officer’s encroachment on a per-
son’s Fourth Amendment rights.161  Justice Sotomayor noted that by admit-
ting unlawfully obtained evidence, courts are rewarding a police officer’s 
“manifest neglect if not open defiance” of the protections of the Constitu-
tion.162 
Justice Sotomayor went on to apply the factors articulated in Brown v. 
Illinois, rejecting the majority’s conclusion that when looked at in totality, 
the factors weigh in favor of the State and the admission of the evidence.163  
Justice Sotomayor agreed that the temporal proximity factor weighed in favor 
of Mr. Strieff, as Officer Fackrell stopped Mr. Strieff “and immediately ran 
a warrant check.”164  Still, she argued that the “discovery of a warrant was 
not some intervening surprise that [Officer Fackrell] could not have antici-
pated” as there is an exceedingly large “backlog of outstanding warrants” in 
Salt Lake County, Utah.165  Justice Sotomayor also asserted that Officer 
Fackrell stopped Mr. Strieff for the sole purpose of procuring evidence, de-
scribing Officer Fackrell’s stop as an “expedition for evidence in the hope 
that something might turn up.”166  Ultimately Justice Sotomayor concluded 
that the drugs should have been excluded as Officer Fackrell found them “by 
exploiting his own constitutional violation,”167 she reasoned, “[t]he officer 
found the drugs only after learning of Strieff’s traffic violation; and he 
learned of Strieff’s traffic violation only because he unlawfully stopped 
Strieff to check his driver’s license.”168 
Justice Kagan also wrote a dissenting opinion, recognizing that “[t]he 
exclusionary rule serves a crucial function—to deter unconstitutional police 
conduct” but acknowledged that the “suppression of evidence also ‘exacts a 
heavy toll,’” with consequences including the “release of criminals without 
just punishment.”169  Subsequently, Justice Kagan reasoned that there must 
be “sound balance between those two competing considerations,” applying 
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the exclusionary rule only when the suppression of evidence will lead to sub-
stantial deterrence of unlawful state action.170  In balancing these two consid-
erations, Justice Kagan turned to the three factors articulated in Brown v. Il-
linois.171  While Justice Kagan agreed with the majority’s conclusion that the 
temporal proximity factor weighed in favor of Mr. Strieff, she differed from 
the majority’s finding that Officer Fackrell’s actions were not purposeful or 
flagrant.172  Justice Kagan instead stated that “the seizure of Strieff was a 
calculated decision, taken with so little justification that the State has never 
tried to defend its legality.”173  Finally, Justice Kagan, in evaluating the “in-
tervening circumstance” factor, found that in order for an occurrence to be 
intervening, it must be unforeseeable.174  Justice Kagan made clear that Of-
ficer Fackrell’s discovery of Mr. Strieff’s outstanding warrant could not be 
intervening because checking for outstanding warrants is part of Salt Lake 
City’s normal detention procedure, and these checks often result in the dis-
covery of arrest warrants.175  Ultimately, Justice Kagan found that all three 
Brown factors required the suppression of the evidence.176  In closing, she 
argued that the majority’s misapplication of the test, in fact, incentivizes an 
officer to violate the Fourth Amendment of the Constitution by stopping an 
individual without reasonable suspicion, as the stop could yield admissible 
evidence.177 
IV. ANALYSIS 
In Utah v. Strieff, the Supreme Court evaluated “whether the prohibition 
on admitting evidence [obtained through an illegal stop] dissolves if the of-
ficer discovers, after making the stop but before finding the [evidence], that 
the person has an outstanding arrest warrant.”178  The Court ultimately held 
that the evidence “seized as part of the search incident to arrest is admissible 
because the officer’s discovery of the arrest warrant attenuated the connec-
tion between the unlawful stop and the evidence seized incident to arrest.”179  
In coming to this conclusion, the Court applied the three-factor test for the 
attenuation doctrine articulated in Brown v. Illinois.180  The Court’s reasoning 
in this case is flawed, as it misinterpreted the “intervening circumstances” 
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factor from Brown181 by equating it to the independent source doctrine182 and 
ignored the requirement of unforeseeability.183  Furthermore, the Court erred 
in concluding that Officer Fackrell’s conduct was merely “negligent,” and, 
in doing so, disregarded the prime purpose of the exclusionary rule: deter-
rence of “unlawful police conduct.”184  The Court’s holding in Strieff has sig-
nificantly broadened the scope of the attenuation doctrine, which has the ef-
fect of narrowing the application of the exclusionary rule and the protections 
guaranteed under the Fourth Amendment. 
A.  The Court Incorrectly Applied the “Intervening Circumstances” 
Factor 
In reaching its holding, the Strieff Court strongly relied on the second 
factor articulated in Brown v. Illinois: “the presence of intervening circum-
stances.”185  The Court determined that this factor weighed heavily in favor 
of the state, and the discovery of a pre-existing warrant is an intervening cir-
cumstance that attenuates the causal relationship between the illegal stop and 
the evidence found.186  In reaching this conclusion, the Court compared the 
facts relevant to the “intervening circumstances” analysis in Mr. Strieff’s 
case to the facts in Segura v. United States, a case where the Court applied a 
different exception to the exclusionary rule: the independent source doc-
trine.187  The Court found that the pre-existence of Mr. Strieff’s warrant com-
pelled Officer Fackrell to arrest him, an event unrelated to the initial illegal 
stop.188  The Court’s analysis of the “intervening circumstances” factor in 
Strieff was flawed because it disregarded the true intention of the attenuation 
doctrine189 and incorrectly compared the intervening circumstances factor to 
the independent source doctrine.190 
1.  The Court Ignored the Correct Meaning of “Intervening 
Circumstance” 
The Strieff majority plainly stated that the discovery of an outstanding 
warrant was enough to meet the threshold of what constitutes an “intervening 
circumstance.”191  In reaching this decision, however, the Court ignored the 
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primary inquiry under the attenuation doctrine: whether the evidence at issue 
has been discovered through the “exploitation of [an] illegality or instead by 
means sufficiently distinguishable to be purged of the primary taint.”192  The 
Court’s application of the attenuation doctrine—and more specifically, the 
“intervening circumstance” factor—has strayed so far from this primary in-
quiry that it no longer serves the intended purpose of the exclusionary rule 
“to deter future unlawful police conduct.”193 
The Court’s divergence from the original meaning of “intervening cir-
cumstances” becomes clear when analyzing the Strieff holding in light of the 
Court’s precedent.  Although the attenuation cases that followed Brown did 
not apply the three-factor test that Brown initially proposed,194 the Court’s 
application of the “intervening circumstances” factor can still be critiqued by 
looking at the case from which the three factors were derived: Wong Sun v. 
United States.195  In Wong Sun, the Court first assessed the facts surrounding 
the arrest of the defendant, James Wah Toy, who gave a statement to the 
police following his illegal arrest that led the police to a second target, Johnny 
Yee.196  Upon Yee’s arrest, the police found heroine at his place of residence; 
however, the Court noted that “Toy’s illegal arrest led directly to his state-
ments implicating Yee, which led directly to the discovery of the drugs.”197  
The Court rejected the State’s notion that Toy’s statement was an intervening 
circumstance,198 and instead held that the narcotics must be suppressed be-
cause they “were ‘come at by the exploitation of [the police’s] illegality.’”199 
The Court then turned its attention to another defendant, Wong Sun, 
who was illegally arrested in his home after Yee and Toy made statements 
implicating him.200  After Wong Sun’s arrest and arraignment, he was re-
leased on his own recognizance and then voluntarily returned to the police 
station several days later to give a statement.201  Although the Court was un-
able to determine what events transpired between Wong Sun’s release and 
subsequent return to the police station, it still held that the statement was ad-
missible, as “the connection between the [illegal] arrest and the statement had 
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‘become so attenuated as to dissipate the taint.’”202  These two examples il-
lustrate the error committed by the Strieff majority in applying the “interven-
ing circumstances” factor.  As in the first example in Wong Sun, where the 
illegal conduct of the officer led directly to the discovery of the heroine,203 
Officer Fackrell’s illegal stop of Mr. Strieff led directly to his discovery of 
the outstanding warrant, which led, in turn, directly to the discovery of the 
drugs.204  Although Wong Sun demonstrated that an intervening circumstance 
does not always need to be palpable, the Court here inserted an intervening 
circumstance where none existed. 
The Strieff majority, however, ignored the fact that the warrant would 
not have been discovered if not for Officer Fackrell’s illegal actions and 
claimed that the mere existence of the outstanding warrant was enough to 
constitute an intervening circumstance.205  This logical jump discounts the 
key detail that Officer Fackrell “discovered Strieff’s drugs by exploiting his 
own illegal conduct,”206 the exact type of transgression that the exclusionary 
rule is designed to prevent.207  The Court’s focus “on the existence of the 
warrant prior to the stop . . . seemed somewhat to obscure the fact that the 
discovery of the warrant . . . seemed to follow quite naturally from the delib-
erate actions of the officer[,]”208 an obscurity that allows an officer to create 
his own intervening circumstance. 
Additionally, as Justice Kagan pointed out in her dissent, a circumstance 
is considered intervening only if it is unforeseeable.209  In this case, Officer 
Fackrell made the illegal stop and then immediately called a police dispatcher 
to run a warrant check.210  The subsequent discovery of the warrant “was not 
some intervening surprise that [Officer Fackrell] could not have antici-
pated.”211  Instead, it was a result of the normal procedure that police officers 
in South Salt Lake City follow.212  Given Utah’s exceptional number of out-
standing warrants, Officer Fackrell’s discovery of Mr. Strieff’s outstanding 
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warrant was not an unforeseeable occurrence that should be deemed an inter-
vening circumstance.213  As Justice Kagan articulated in her dissent, “rather 
than breaking the causal chain, predictable effects . . . are its very links.”214  
Officer Fackrell knew or should have known that the warrant check he was 
about to run could conceivably result in the discovery of an outstanding war-
rant for Mr. Strieff’s arrest—knowledge that eliminates the possibility of this 
action yielding unforeseeable results.215  Ultimately, the Strieff majority set a 
precedent that is in conflict with the purpose behind the exclusionary rule—
the deterrence of unlawful police conduct216—and broadened the attenuation 
doctrine to encompass more than was ever originally intended. 
2.  The Court Incorrectly Equated the “Intervening Circumstances” 
Factor with the Independent Source Doctrine 
While evaluating the “intervening circumstances” factor, the Court 
heavily relied on a comparison of the facts at issue to the facts that the Court 
evaluated in Segura v. United States.217  The Strieff majority acknowledged 
that the Segura Court applied the independent source doctrine and not the 
attenuation doctrine, but still deemed the comparison appropriate in the eval-
uation of the “intervening circumstances” factor, as the facts were “simi-
lar.”218  In Segura, state officials applied for a warrant to search a suspect’s 
apartment.219  While the warrant application was pending, the state officials 
entered the apartment and conducted a security sweep.220  After the warrant 
was granted, the agents then did another sweep of the apartment and collected 
evidence.221  Although the Court agreed that the initial entry and security 
sweep of the apartment violated the Fourth Amendment, it found that sup-
pression of the evidence obtained during the search warrant’s execution was 
not necessary because “there was an independent source for the warrant un-
der which that evidence was seized.”222  The Strieff majority interpreted this 
language to mean that the mere existence of an outstanding warrant is enough 
to justify the admission of evidence seized as a direct result of an illegal 
stop.223 
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As Justice Sotomayor pointed out in her dissent, the majority’s interpre-
tation of the Segura holding has no application in cases like Strieff.224  The 
Segura Court came to its holding by relying on the fact that the agents did 
not use the information that they illegally procured in order to obtain the 
search warrant.225  The Court emphasized that the search warrant was re-
quested prior to the agents’ illegal entry into the apartment and was granted 
on grounds that were known to the agents before that entry occurred.226  For 
that reason, the Court held that the evidence discovered was admissible be-
cause the warrant was procured through an independent source.227  The Se-
gura Court’s reasoning makes it clear that its holding has no bearing on the 
Strieff case, as Officer Fackrell only found the drugs on Mr. Strieff’s person 
after discovering Mr. Strieff had an outstanding warrant, and Officer Fackrell 
only discovered that Mr. Strieff had an outstanding warrant because he ille-
gally stopped him on the street and ran a warrant check, a clear exploitation 
of Officer Fackrell’s own illegal conduct.228  As Justice Sotomayor indicated, 
the facts of “Segura would be similar only if the agents used information they 
illegally obtained from the apartment to procure a search warrant.”229  In-
stead, in Segura, there was a very clear separation between the information 
obtained through the illegality and the procurement of the search warrant,230 
a separation that is not seen when the warrant is only discovered through the 
unlawful conduct of a police officer. 
The comparison of Segura to Strieff, while erroneous, also appears to 
ignore the objective of the independent source doctrine as articulated in Nix 
v. Williams, which balances: 
[T]he interest of society in deterring unlawful police conduct and 
the public interest in having juries receive all probative evidence 
of a crime . . . by putting the police in the same, not a worse, posi-
tion that [sic] they would have been in if no police error or miscon-
duct had occurred.231 
The majority in Strieff, instead, used the independent source doctrine as 
a means to place the police in a better—not the same—position than they 
would have been in had the illegal stop not occurred.  Although, the police 
would have been able to arrest Mr. Strieff at any other time upon the legal 
discovery of his outstanding warrant, as the Supreme Court of Utah pointed 
out, it would be impossible to determine if he would have been in possession 
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of the contraband “on any future date on which he may have been arrested 
on the outstanding warrant.”232  The Court not only interjected the independ-
ent source doctrine where it does not belong, but it also ignored the doctrine’s 
purpose by using it to give an advantage to the State when it clearly calls for 
an equal playing field.233 
B.  The Court Incorrectly Applied the “Purpose and Flagrancy” 
Factor  
In reaching its holding, the Court also found that the “purpose and fla-
grancy” factor weighed strongly in favor of the State on the grounds that Of-
ficer Fackrell’s actions did not rise to a level in need of deterrence.234  Spe-
cifically, the Court concluded that “Officer Fackrell made two good-faith 
mistakes” in his detention of Mr. Strieff and found that Officer Fackrell was 
negligent at most.235  In categorizing Officer Fackrell’s actions as “good-faith 
mistakes,” the Court has turned the analysis of this factor into one akin to the 
good faith doctrine.236  Under the good faith doctrine, however, an officer’s 
mistake is forgiven only if the officer “did not willfully violate the Fourth 
Amendment.”237  In applying the good faith doctrine, the Court has acknowl-
edged that “the purpose of the exclusionary rule is to deter unlawful police 
conduct,”238 and determined that its prime purpose was not promoted through 
the suppression of evidence that was discovered through an officer’s good 
faith mistake.239  In this case, however, Officer Fackrell’s actions were not in 
“good faith” as the majority seems to believe, and even when accepting the 
majority’s opinion that Officer Fackrell’s actions were merely negligent, this 
“negligent” behavior is still susceptible to deterrence.240  As Justice So-
tomayor stated in her dissent, “the Fourth Amendment does not tolerate an 
officer’s unreasonable searches and seizures just because he did not know 
any better[,]”241 and “officers prone to negligence” can still be deterred from 
conducting unconstitutional stops and seizures in the future through the prec-
edent set in court.242 
                                                          
 232.  State v. Strieff, 357 P.3d 532, 546 (Utah 2015), rev’d sub nom. Utah v. Strieff, 136 S. Ct. 
2056 (2016). 
 233.  Nix, 467 U.S. at 443. 
 234.  Strieff, 136 S. Ct. at 2063.  
 235.  Id.  
 236.  See supra Part II.B.3.  
 237.  SIMMONS & HUTCHINS, supra note 197, at 653.  
 238.  United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 919 (1984) (quoting United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 
531, 542 (1975)). 
 239.  SIMMONS & HUTCHINS, supra note 197, at 653. 
 240.  Utah v. Strieff, 136 S. Ct. 2056, 2067–68 (2016) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
 241.  Id. at 2068.  
 242.  Id. 
 2017] UTAH v. STRIEFF 137 
The Court not only erroneously concluded that negligent actions could 
not be deterred, but also erred in deeming his actions only negligent.243  In-
stead, Officer Fackrell’s seizure of Mr. Strieff “was a calculated decision, 
taken with so little justification that the State has never tried to defend its 
legality.”244  Officer Fackrell stated that he stopped Mr. Strieff to ascertain 
what was going on in the house, but openly admitted that he had no basis for 
his actions aside from seeing Mr. Strieff leave the suspected drug house.245  
The Court asserted that Officer Fackrell’s “decision to run the warrant check 
was a ‘negligibly burdensome precautio[n]’ for officer safety.”246  But Of-
ficer Fackrell, by his own account, did not fear Mr. Strieff.247  Instead, Officer 
Fackrell’s actions were a deliberate attempt to discover criminal wrongdoing 
where Officer Fackrell would have otherwise hit a dead end.248  Although the 
majority stated that Officer Fackrell’s actions did not constitute a “fishing 
expedition,”249 these are the exact kind of actions that the Court has previ-
ously held unconstitutional because they were conducted “in the hope that 
something would turn up.”250  Officer Fackrell’s conduct was so flagrant—
such a constitutional misstep—that the Court’s decision to deem it negligent 
was a complete blunder in light of its own precedent.251 
In the Court’s misapplication of the purpose and flagrancy factor, it 
seemed to ignore the prime purpose of the exclusionary rule, “to deter unlaw-
ful police conduct.”252  Justice Powell once explained that the attenuation 
doctrine “attempts to mark the point at which the detrimental consequences 
of illegal police action become so attenuated that the deterrent effect of the 
exclusionary rule no longer justifies its cost.”253  In this case, the Court has 
broadened the attenuation doctrine to a point where it will not only fail to 
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deter unlawful police conduct, it will incentivize it.254  Justice Kagan, in her 
dissent, adeptly articulated this point.  Justice Kagan noted that, in the past, 
an officer would be deterred from stopping someone without cause for inves-
tigative reasons, as this stop would likely yield evidence that would be 
deemed inadmissible in court.255  The majority’s holding, however, ignores 
the intended deterrent effects of the exclusionary rule and instead relays that 
an illegal “stop may well yield admissible evidence: So long as the target is 
one of the many millions of people in this country with an outstanding arrest 
warrant . . . .”256  This new precedent set by the Strieff majority will allow 
officers to retroactively claim grounds for making an unconstitutional stop, 
eliminating the deterrent purpose of the rule all together.257 
V.  CONCLUSION 
In Utah v. Strieff, the Supreme Court held that the evidence “seized as a 
part of the search incident to arrest is admissible because the officer’s dis-
covery of the arrest warrant attenuated the connection between the unlawful 
stop and the evidence seized incident to arrest.”258  Ultimately, this judgment 
was flawed, as the Court erroneously equated the “intervening circum-
stances” factor to the independent source doctrine,259 and ignored the require-
ment of unforeseeability, a condition that is not met by the facts of Strieff.260  
Furthermore, the Court incorrectly held that the officer’s actions were merely 
negligent, and not “purposeful and flagrant.”261  The Court’s inconsistent 
analysis has deemed the purpose of the exclusionary rule—the deterrence of 
police misconduct—moot, while simultaneously narrowing the protections 
guaranteed under the Fourth Amendment.262 
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